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Abstract
Critical infrastructures such as oil and gas pipelines, the electric power grid, and
railways, rely on the proper operation of supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems. Current SCADA systems, however, do not have sufficient tailored
electronic security solutions. Solutions available are developed primarily for information
technology systems. Indeed the toolkit for SCADA incident prevention and response is
unavailing as the operating parameters associated with SCADA systems are different from
information technology systems. The unique environment necessitates tailored solutions.
Consider the programmable logic controllers (PLCs) that directly connect to end physical
systems for control and monitoring of operating parameters – compromise of a PLC could
result in devastating physical consequences. Yet PLCs remain particularly vulnerable due
to a lack of firmware auditing capabilities.
This research presents a tool developed specifically for the SCADA environment to
verify PLC firmware. The tool captures serial data during firmware uploads and then
verifies against a known good firmware executable binary. Attempts to inject modified
and/or malicious firmware are identified by the tool. Additionally, the tool can replay and
analyze captured data by emulating a PLC during firmware upload. The emulation
capability enables verification of the firmware upload from an interface computer without
requiring modifications to or interactions with the operational SCADA system. The ability
to isolate the tool from production systems and verify the validity of firmware makes the
tool a viable application for SCADA incident response teams and security engineers.
iv
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
The nation’s critical infrastructure depends on secure, reliable supervisory control
and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, which provide critical control, communication,
and monitoring capabilities over geographically dispersed locations [1], [2]. As SCADA
systems increasingly interconnect via unsecured networks, security solutions have focused
on creating logical and physical boundaries between systems and the network layer [3],
[4], [5]. Even with network isolation, however, additional attack ingress points have
manifested in SCADA systems.
Consider, for example, the Stuxnet virus. Among the many implications associated
with Stuxnet, the attack methodology demonstrated the ability to exploit critical systems
through nontraditional inputs [6]. Indeed, the initial ingress point was not associated with
the compromise of a standard information technology system via a network access point
(e.g., compromise of firewall through the Internet). Instead, the virus propagated via a
physical medium, eventually gaining access to an internal trusted node in the SCADA
network. Although the attack vector by itself is not specifically unique - USB drives were
placed by a foreign intelligence agency to exfiltrate sensitive data once inserted into U.S.
Central Command systems [7] - it is the first documented case of a targeted attack against
a specific SCADA system that resulted in kinetic effects [6].
SCADA systems are comprised of interconnected nodes consisting of master
controlling systems, end devices, communication links and various support systems [8]. A
cyber attack on a SCADA system assumes that vulnerabilities stem from the ability of an
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external actor to gain access to and communicate with nodes on the network. As a result,
today’s security perspective is to isolate and limit access points to the system from any
external network [5]. While it is true that the network vulnerabilities currently considered
are valid input vectors for an attack, they are not the only vectors that introduce untrusted
and unvalidated inputs into a trusted system.
1.2 Motivation
The current tool set for attack response and mitigation is inadequately tailored to
SCADA systems [9], [10]. Generally, the available resources are modified network-based
tools adapted to incorporate the SCADA environment (e.g., packet capture tools, general
operating system analysis and network-based intrusion detection systems). Although these
tools provide a level of protection and analysis in a broad sense, tailored security solutions
are needed to address the emerging threat specific to SCADA systems. Perhaps the most
pressing concern is verifying the proper operation of field devices, such as programmable
logic controllers (PLCs), which directly control and monitor the end physical systems.
These devices typically operate ‘below’ the network layer and have few security
mechanisms. As demonstrated by Stuxnet, unimpeded manipulation of these devices can
have direct physical consequences. Indeed, there are currently no viable tools readily
available to validate the proper operating parameters of PLC devices controlling the
nation’s critical infrastructure.
1.3 Research Purpose and Goals
This research examines a method for validating PLC firmware. Firmware, in the most
basic sense, is fixed microcode that provides the bridge between hardware and
higher-level programmable software on a device. An attacker that can gain access to and
manipulate firmware has full control over the functionality of the device and can mask
actions from detection.
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The goal of this research is to develop a tool that validates PLC firmware and ensures
that any attempt to alter the firmware is detected. The tool is intended to capture a PLC
firmware load and identify any modifications from an established baseline to include data
insertion, deletion, and modification. The tool should not introduce additional input
vectors into the SCADA system. Additionally, an ideal implementation enables
assessment with no impact to the operational SCADA system.
1.4 Approach
The tool is designed for an environment consisting of an Allen-Bradley FlexLogix
5434 PLC and Rockwell Software’s RSLogix 5000 interface tool. The tool captures and
audits serial communication using the Allen-Bradley DF1 full duplex protocol set.
Once captured, the firmware is validated against a known good baseline using a
comparative analysis derived from observed firmware load characteristics. In the most
basic form, identifying modified firmware is best accomplished by comparing against a
known good firmware baseline. Note that simple hash comparison for firmware is not as
straightforward as checking for modified files in a traditional operating system. Indeed,
the requirement to capture and analyze the data during load, coupled with the comparison,
makes firmware validation nontrivial.
Note that no two firmware loads are precisely the same due to changing protocol
fields. Comparative analysis of captured data enables the tool to identify and account for
these differences while validating the firmware bytes are consistent with the baseline. The
altered firmware loads are evaluated using the tool’s firmware verification routine, MD5,
and bitwise check routines to demonstrate the ineffectiveness of MD5 and bitwise routines
at identifying modifications.
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1.5 Research Contributions
This research serves to introduce a tool to detect the loading of malicious or altered
firmware to a PLC device. Application of the tool can assist incident response teams in
pinpointing malware access points, as well as security engineers in providing assurance in
the validity of PLC operations.
1.6 Assumptions and Limitations
Firmware verification is valid under the assumption that firmware modifications are
manifested during a firmware loading session. However, it may be possible for malware to
infect other components of a SCADA system. The tool requires a known good baseline to
successfully validate firmware captures. This research assumes a known good baseline for
comparison. Additionally, because tool evaluation is in a controlled environment, it is
assumed that test cases are indicative of similar classes of firmware modifications (e.g., a
one byte length increase is indicative of an n byte increase). Finally the variety of PLC
manufacturers, configurations, and capabilities is a limiting factor for developing a broad
spectrum tool. It is expected that further functionality can be added in future development
iterations.
1.7 Organization
The remaining thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides background
information, pertinent research, and literature review. Chapter 3 presents the research
methodology. Chapter 4 presents results and analysis. Chapter 5 discusses research
conclusions, impact, and future work.
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2 Background
2.1 SCADA System Overview
Critical infrastructures such as oil and gas pipelines, the electric power grid, and
railways, rely on the proper operation of SCADA systems. SCADA systems support
various applications and may extend over thousands of miles. Operators remotely control
and monitor SCADA systems from centralized monitoring stations, typically through a
human machine interface (HMI). Field devices, such as are either PLCs or remote
terminal units (RTUs), automate physical system operation by implementing digital
control messages into actions (e.g., opening or closing breakers and valves, monitoring
alarm conditions, and collecting system and environment data from sensors).
Remote field devices communicate with master control devices though a hierarchical
communication paradigm. Master devices send direct messages requesting data or
specifying actions to remote field devices, which reply with generated response messages.
The master may be notified if the device detects an alarm condition. Figure 2.1 illustrates
a simple control system consisting of a master device and a field device. The master
device can send commands to control pumps or valves, or request sensor meter values.
The field device replies with appropriate responses.
A PLC contains a microprocessor and read-only memory (ROM) or flash memory for
storing firmware and control logic [5],[8]. A PLC typically has three software levels as
shown in Figure 2.2. Modifiable layers include the control program, the firmware, and in
some instances, the basic input/output system (BIOS). At the lowest level, the BIOS or
other hard coded firmware occupies a portion of read-only memory and provides basic
functionality. This routine executes when the PLC is powered on, initializing the PLC
state and loading the operating system [11], [12]. If the operating system, or firmware, has
not been installed and needs to be loaded, the BIOS handles this as well. Note that in
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Figure 2.1: A generic SCADA system setup
many PLCs, the BIOS is not electronically modifiable. However in instances such as the
Siemens’ S7 modular embedded controllers which run embedded Windows XP, the BIOS
is reprogrammable [13].
The operating system, referred to as firmware, runs on top of the BIOS layer.
Firmware can range from simple proprietary software to high level processor demanding
software such as embedded Linux or Windows versions. The loaded firmware has the
ability to control random access memory (RAM), the runtime environment, sensors and
actuators, and serves as the interpreter for the user defined logic program meant to control
the SCADA system. Note that Allen-Bradley uses in-house created firmware for their
PLCs [14].
The control program represents the highest externally electronically modifiable level
and is typically a ladder logic or high level graphical or textual logic program [15]. In the
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Figure 2.2: PLC software layers
case of the input/output (I/O) modules - built in I/O capabilities are not usually
reprogrammable, however some devices do allow I/O module updates to enable PLC
communication using new protocols. For scope simplification, this research focuses only
on the general PLC level and not any components that may have specific vulnerabilities.
Note that the terms PLC and RTU are often interchanged. Although similar in
functionality, RTUs are less advanced in terms of independent processing capability and
rely on remote monitoring and control [8]. This research focuses on PLCs that have
modifiable firmware and logic program layers.
2.2 Current SCADA Security Landscape
Current SCADA security focuses on traditional network security constructs.
Firewalls and intrusion detection or prevention systems are used to create a
defense-in-depth security architecture, and many SCADA system specific developments
focus on encryption for information security through added confidentiality [16], [17].
However, encrypted data also increases the difficulty of auditing communication data [8].
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Additionally, SCADA security developments often require modifying or adding system
components, which can hinder real time performance [18], [19], [20], [21].
While network defense is critical to security, network based attacks may not be the
primary method of exploitation. Stuxnet infiltrated a non-networked environment via a
nontraditional vector – a USB [22]. Indeed, critical infrastructure is a high value target; an
advanced persistent threat will find an input vector to even the most secure system [23],
[24], [25]. Considering the various non-networked input vectors, security must be applied
beyond the network layer [15].
PLCs are typically monitored and interfaced via a remote human machine interface
[11]. The PLC controls SCADA system equipment and reports information about the site
conditions to the remote monitoring station. A PLC under the control of a malicious user
can produce devastating effects, as evidenced recently by Stuxnet and various historical
attacks [6] [26].
The PLC presents three main vectors for attack: hardware, firmware and
programming. Hardware security requires a trusted supply chain or methods to thoroughly
test the acquired end device. Hardware is the lowest layer of abstraction and, at some
level, must be trusted. Programming modifications alter PLC functionality and can be
manipulated easily with compromise of or access to the specific PLC management
software. Manipulation of PLC programming, however, is readily identifiable as PLC
programs are interpreted instead of compiled and cannot be masked from external PLC
inspection. When considering modifications to the PLC, firmware modification is the
most intrusive and least detectable vector; there are no readily available methods to easily
extract the firmware once loaded on a PLC [27], [28]. Exasperating the problem, as
demonstrated in Figure 2.3, are the number of potential input vectors that enable firmware
alteration (e.g., programming computers, SCADA control systems and access to the
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Figure 2.3: Example non-traditional SCADA system inputs
firmware update software). Indeed, any access point to the PLC or access to the firmware
code to be uploaded provides an avenue to alter the end device’s firmware.
2.3 Security Research
2.3.1 Network Layer Security. To validate the need for increased protocol security,
a series of possible attacks against the MODBUS serial and TCP protocols as well as
against the DNP3 protocol were identified by Huitsing et al. and East et al. [29], [30].
The identified effects range from intermittent disruptions to loss of awareness and control
of the system. They analyzed attacks from the standpoint of interception, interruption,
modification, and fabrication attack instances against the master station, end devices, or
the communication network.
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The majority of security developments redesign SCADA networks to add a layer of
encryption. Fovino et al. suggests modifying SCADA architecture to make
communication adhere to a signature. Additionally, they describe an architecture that has
multiple validation ‘filtering units’ for each of the end devices such that a mathematical
majority of the units per device must be corrupted to send a malicious packet [31]. The
implementation mitigates unauthorized commands, man-in-the-middle attacks, replay
attacks, and malicious packet attacks. However, this architecture must incorporate
additional cryptography supporting devices. Another secure cryptographic-based
environment is described by Pal et al. The authors note that the limited computation
capacity, memory capacity, bandwidth, and real-time demands of a SCADA network
environment pose significant technical challenges when implementing cryptography
because key storage, encryption, and decryption require non-trivial processing time. They
propose multiple architectures, each with individual advantages, of key storage and
distribution among a network by a master unit [17].
Intrusion detection systems are proposed by both Morris and Pavurapu, and Wei Gao
et al. [21], [25]. Morris and Pavurapu propose a bump-in-the-wire style device retrofitted
into a network that monitors and handles encryption, analysis, and logging of all packets.
This device would prevent response injection, command injection, and denial of service
attacks. Wei Gao et al. alternatively researched adding network security without the
complications of encryption [25]. Their research provides specific details on an intrusion
detection system developed from a neural network algorithm with statistics on the ability
to correctly detect malicious traffic. This research focuses on developing a suitable
intrusion detection system, and not on adding a layer of encryption.
Research by Mander et al. and Gilchrist examines building security into the DNP3
protocol [16], [32]. Mander et al. proposes adding object based security rules based on
packet fields such as function code and data field values to prevent modifications to end
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device configuration settings; non-conforming packets are dropped. Gilchrist presents
adding a secure authentication standard to the DNP3 protocol using keyed-hash message
authentication codes. The development was implemented by the DNP3 IEEE 1815
standard [33]. The specification applies only to how the authentication is negotiated, and
not how keys are stored or distributed – the standard leaves encryption details to the user’s
discretion. The authors imply that encryption is intended to be used with the standard,
though the protocol standards do not require encryption for functionality.
Adding layers of network security to SCADA networks proactively mitigates the
threat of external unauthorized access; however, it is important to note that these methods
only protect the perimeter of a network. End devices such as PLCs typically are not
capable of deploying their own information technology (IT) protection methods [8].
2.3.2 Software Data Integrity. Software level data integrity checking is pertinent
to analyzing PLC software integrity. Data integrity checks are performed through a variety
of hashing functions [34]. MD5 is a commonly used hash function to check if a file has
been modified [35]. A known good MD5 is compared against the MD5 of the data in
question. Equivalent results provide a measure of integrity that the data remains
unmodified.
2.4 Embedded Device Security
Current SCADA systems primarily use commercially available operating systems for
the HMI system. Vulnerabilities in these systems are openly attainable, allowing an
attacker to gain expertise on a platform without internal access to SCADA system
components [36]. PLCs however, are more widespread with each manufacturer and model
typically implementing different firmware. Because PLCs are in effect a microprocessor
device, an analysis of the current research on embedded devices is important to garner
insight to applicable security solutions.
11
Embedded device security focuses on controlling the onboard memory of a device
and attesting to its validity. This is applicable to a typical PLC design because the PLC
firmware and logic programs are stored in ROM or flash memory and RAM respectively.
Assuring that a device’s static configuration or its dynamic execution state is secure
increases confidence that a device has not been compromised [18]. Current research on
embedded device security involves attestation that the device state has not been changed.
Research has been done on secure protocol development, software level attestation,
hardware level attestation, and a combination of these designs. Attestation can be
accomplished by integrating a hardware device as an external verifier, or on the software
level where a trusted portion of code exists to check the state of the device. Additionally,
research has been accomplished for remote schemas to allow verification without physical
presence over a network. Remote attestation requires a secure communication protocol. A
discussion of embedded device security research follows.
2.4.1 Hardware Level Attestation Implementations. Implementations from
research executed by Basile et al., Feller et al., and Khan et al. add hardware level
components to externally verify the device state [18], [37], [38].
Research by Basile et al. focuses on detecting if executed code has been modified by
utilizing an field programmable gate array (FPGA) to build a secure architecture. The
authors’ goal is to engineer a setup that makes it difficult to create a successful real world
attack. Various network and environmental attack scenarios are addressed. However, the
authors do note that this method of protection is not intended for high value targets - a
motivated attacker with resources could still compromise an FPGA.
TinyTPM by Feller et al. was presented to port trusted computing to FPGA devices
by adding a validation module that consumed few resources in static logic [37]. TinyTPM
performs bootstrapping functions in order to verify the system state before any dynamic
logic execution can occur. The module uses cryptography but consumes fewer resources
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than predecessors’ Trusted Platform Module implementations in order to add security.
Khan et al. presents another verification method for embedded systems utilizing an
external FPGA to store a hash and to check memory on device reset [38]. If the computed
hash matches the stored hash during the boot process, then the power up continues to
allow the device to run, if they do not then the device stays in reset mode. This method
adds some delay at boot time; however, it does not affect the system’s functionality after
verification occurs. This could be beneficial for PLC security; however, changes would be
needed to implement boot time checking in a critical process environment as a no-start
situation is unacceptable and may create a denial of service situation.
2.4.2 Software Level Attestation Implementations. Adding hardware devices is not
always feasible, and can be expensive. Software based attestation seeks to discover that an
environment is safe by using provably secure methods.
Software-based attestation for embedded devices (SWATT) is one of the earliest
projects that presents the idea of using a purely software based external verifier [39].
SWATT acts as in intermediate between the device and external actors communicating
with the device. A challenge-response protocol is used to only allow validated devices to
communicate. The technique is similar to secure bootstrapping; however, SWATT is
unique because it does not require additional hardware to externally verify the system was
in a secure state. Note that complete knowledge of the hardware is required for SWATT to
be implemented successfully. The verification process is alleged secure because any
changes to the checking routine would cause a measurable time delay. However, one of
the flaws with SWATT is the assumption that the device is in a trusted environment. The
authors note that because of the untrusted environment, any integrity checking functions
stored on the unit could be modified by an attacker, making them insecure as well.
Igure et al. present modern improvements on general software based attestation [40].
Though not specific to embedded devices, the paper discusses ensuring the system is in a
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secure state by allowing only the attestation process to be active, and then by scanning
memory to verify this assumption. The verification process relies on the idea that
computation has access to all free RAM, and if less than the correct amount is free, a
noticeable delay will occur, indicating the presence of malware. When executing the
validation routine, all processes should be swapped out, including the kernel, to maximize
free RAM. The validation is then run by a monolith kernel. If less than the anticipated
amount of RAM is free, then secondary memory must be used. The security of this
method is guaranteed as long as the assumption holds that RAM is faster to access than
secondary memory, which is a more secure method than just pure software validation
alone.
A more thorough but computationally demanding approach is taken by AbuHmed et
al. The authors claim that attesting a devices entire memory space is the most secure as it
does not allow the attacker to save the original memory in a different location [41]. Any
additional memory can be filled with incompressible noise so that an attacker cannot
compress data in unused memory to free memory for malicious code additions.
Providing firmware updates remotely, or over the air, is another problem in memory
attestation. Updating every PLC directly is infeasible in systems with abundant or difficult
to reach controllers. Nilsson et al. presents a security framework for secure firmware
updates by connecting to a trusted portal and downloading updates using a secure protocol
[42]. The firmware is verified by using hardware virtualization and running two systems -
one system is the embedded controller system and the other is the verification system. This
allows self verification of updates remotely. The secure protocol is a unique development
to increase secure communication. Instead of using a trusted remote verifier as with
SWATT, Nilsson et al. seeks to use virtualization to separate a trusted microkernel and an
untrusted embedded operating system. The downloaded binary can be verified before it is
flashed and the secure protocol protects against third party modifications from the trusted
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sender to the receiver. This schema can verify correct downloads and successful flashing
for firmware updates, however, it is still an incomplete solution to PLC firmware security
because it does not account for modified firmware sent from a trusted source.
Research for secure remote memory attestation was accomplished by Kyungsub et al.
[20]. They designed a one-way memory attestation protocol for smart meters (OMAP).
OMAP utilizes a random memory traversal checksum to protect against local attacks and
forwards the checksum to a utility to verify if the checksum corresponds to unmodified
memory. Modifications are detected through a random memory traversal checksum
computation. This implementation relies on the memory verification routine to be secure.
The research by Ce Meng et al. notes with heterogeneous components in a system, the
overall trust of a system depends on trusting its components [43]. They discuss attesting to
the building process in addition to remote attestation methods.
The limitation with purely software based attestation is that depending on the
knowledge of the attacker, the firmware in an embedded device may be completely
reprogrammed yet imitate a good system. The validation methods add time and
processing overhead, which may degrade real time constrained systems or may be
infeasible for systems with limited memory or processing capability. Hardware security
solutions require system compatibility and can limit device functionality. Currently
operating critical infrastructure systems would require retroactive installation to include
hardware modifications. While attestations on both levels afford improvements for general
embedded devices, neither is tailored to provide the high level of verification necessary for
critical infrastructure systems.
2.4.3 Embedded Device Configuration Management. Applying security
retroactively is inadequate for a mature security posture. In addition to adding device
security, controlling device updates and modifications are imperative for security
maintenance. The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) published a
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best practices guide for firmware control on microprocessors [44]. IEEE suggests that
microprocessors should have strict configuration management. Every update should be
tested before it is implemented to ensure that the current functionality will not be
impacted, and the previous version should always be backed up in case of malfunction.
Firmware should only be updated if it is required for functionality. However, the guide
does not discuss vectors that malware might use to compromise firmware or an embedded
device, or how to mitigate threats.
2.5 Integrated Circuit Supply Chain Management
Systems that utilize integrated circuit (IC) components must make the assumption
that the hardware device operates as intended. Regardless of how robust a security system
is, if it is running on insecure hardware, then its trustworthiness is undermined. Even with
extensive testing, it is infeasible to check every layer on every chip for correct
functionality. Thus, trusting an IC extends trust to every point along the supply chain.
Counterfeit parts are an industry issue, highlighting the feasibility for compromised parts
to be integrated into a system [28]. Legacy systems are particularly susceptible to
compromise as replacement parts are often obsolete.
Supply chain management is critical to mitigating risks in embedded devices before
they reach the end system. Since all technology relies on trustworthy hardware, significant
research has been done, as well as government programs put in place, to efficiently detect
and prevent hardware modification. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA) conducted the “TRUST in IC’s” Effort in 2007, a three year initiative to develop
integrated circuits compromise detection methods [45], [46]. DARPA continued this
research in 2010 with the Integrity and Reliability of Integrated Circuits (IRIS) initiative
to determine if an IC has been modified in a malicious manner [27].
Supply chain attacks can be grouped into three general categories - circuitry
modification, programmable hardware attack, or firmware attack [47]. Circuit
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modification deals with altering the physical components of an IC. An attacker in the
supply chain can also reprogram hardware through electrically erasable programmable
read-only memory (EEPROM).
Firmware, which is an abstraction above programmable hardware, can also be
modified to change device functionality. Once a device has been modified, it is difficult to
detect modifications in a nondestructive manner. Exploits can be injected during design,
production, distribution, or maintenance phases of an IC’s lifecycle. Design phase exploits
are especially subversive because the malicious logic is designed into the chip without any
need for physical interception and modification.
There exist documented cases of ‘kill switches’ built into microprocessors to disable
functionality [48]. Analyzing IC layers to verify the absence of malicious logic is difficult
and most methods destroy the IC in the process. The Department of Defense (DOD) has
taken measures to increase trust in hardware by validating American commercial plants as
trusted IC foundries, however this does not guarantee a trusted product. Additionally,
faults can be engineered such that ICs operate normally, but then fail significantly before
the predicted lifetime.
Hardware level changes introduce myriad attacks, including timed attacks and
disabling encryption security. Furthermore, ICs can be modified even after they have been
manufactured. While this requires significant resources and blueprint knowledge, the
possibility is not unreasonable for a well funded and motivated attacker [48]. Solutions
that do not involve IC deconstruction utilize side channel analysis. Side channel analysis
operates under the assumption that inserting a trojan on the hardware level will degrade
chip performance or otherwise alter functionality in an observable manner. Hardware
trojan detection methods are not standardized and benchmarking has only been recently
introduced. Even with detection methods, not all hardware can be thoroughly checked.
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Commercial off-the-shelf systems and legacy systems continue to be a difficult problem,
especially considering the global market for IC components [49].
Hardware threats undermine software security as software security can be bypassed
by hardware. Integrated circuits are inherently complex. Malicious logic detection in
hardware is difficult, especially for logic or time activated trojans which lay dormant until
a logic condition is occurs [50].
2.6 Industrial Control System Security Recommendations
In 2009 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) published the National
Infrastructure Protection Plan [2]. The Government Accountability Office also published
testimony on the cyber threat to critical infrastructure [9], [24]. The DHS established the
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) to respond to cyber
incidents, including those in industrial control systems (ICS-CERT).
ICS-CERT provides many standards and best practices for security industrial
automation systems, as well as a cyber security evaluation tool to help increase
organizations’ cyber security posture [51]. ICS-CERT also publishes vulnerabilities found
in industrial control system equipment. They work with other agencies, including the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), International Society for
Automation (ISA), Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure, Department of
Energy (DOE), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), and the national
laboratories to serve as a centralized resource for industrial control cyber security policy.
ICS-CERT presents detailed instructions on implementing system security.
Establishing a segmented network with firewalls and demilitarized zones, applying
configuration management, updating systems, adding authentication, training personnel in
cyber security, conducting risk assessment, securing wireless connections, using
encryption, limiting remote connections, using intrusion detection and prevention, and
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adhering to security standards encompass the general areas ICS-CERT publishes
documentation on, accessible on their website [10].
NIST published a guide for SCADA system security [5]. NIST recommends
restricting physical and logical access to the network, protecting individual SCADA
components, and implementing redundancy. Additional recommendations are
implementing a defense in depth strategy that involves lifecycle security on the system,
adding layered network protection, employing encryption where possible, testing before
changing the system, and utilizing logging and monitoring to track system activity.
The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) published a series of
documents addressing cyber security and reliability standards for critical infrastructure
cyber security [52]. Their standards focus on creating a cyber perimeter with defense in
depth measures such as access controls, authentication, encryption, firewalls, logging, and
intrusion detection systems [53], [54]. The industry cyber security standards published by
these organizations focus on network security and access control. While these
recommendations increase industrial control system security, they may not provide
comprehensive security. Considering the current threat trend, vectors still exist to allow
malicious input into the system.
2.7 Advanced Threat on SCADA Systems
According to a DARPA report by Collins, the United States has to assume
adversaries are nation states with motivation, talent, time, and opportunity to do
significant harm to the United States [46]. Hostile actors may seek to inflict economic or
physical damage by attacking critical infrastructure networks. Possible attacks on a
SCADA system include denial of service, eavesdropping, man in the middle, or hijacking
a system through various infection methods such as a worm, virus, or trojan.
Malware falls into four generalized areas: malware that consumes resources,
malware that degrades a system based on a trigger condition, malware that allows remote
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access, and malware that exfiltrates sensitive data [8]. Resource consumption, particularly
on a resource sensitive SCADA network, degrades communications and uses bandwidth
that the system requires to function properly. Trojans or timed attack malware propagate
to a computer and then execute certain malicious logic to harm that computer’s
functionality, degrading SCADA system performance as well. Remote access malware,
such as a rootkit, hides malicious logic at the kernel level in a system and provides an
attacker to exercise with a back door entry point. This allows an attacker complete control
over the computer. Exfiltration provides an attacker the knowledge necessary to engineer a
targeted attack [8].
2.7.1 The Evolving Threat Trend. The threat trend has become increasingly
targeted over recent years. Initially, targeted attacks originated from disgruntled insiders;
however, this is no longer the case. Recent attacks targeting U.S. Government such as the
exfiltration of Joint Strike Fighter data in April 2009, and the keylogger on remotely
piloted vehicle control stations at Creech Air Force Base in September 2011 demonstrate
the evolution of malware against high value targets [23], [55].
Stuxnet is a compelling example of the insufficiency of critical infrastructure security.
Discovered in June 2010, Stuxnet infected a system not connected to the public network
via a USB exploit. The virus analyzed the computer, only executing its payload if the
system met various requirements. Stuxnet required a target running the Siemens’
SIMATIC STEP 7 software with specific PLC CPU types and with specific numeric
values present in the system data blocks. Once in place on the target system, Stuxnet
modified the dynamic linked library (DLL) which controlled communication from the
STEP 7 software to the PLC.
The PLC program was modified to include a malicious function block, and the
modified DLL controlled the program’s function block locate, read, and write capabilities.
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The DLL modification could modify sent or received data, hiding the additional malicious
function block from system operators [6], [22].
According to Symantec, developers of Stuxnet had extensive prerequisite knowledge
of the target system [6]. However, the lack of overall system protection, input validation,
and secondary fail safes enabled Stuxnet to infect approximately 100,000 hosts, with over
60% of hosts located in Iran, which resulted in physical damage. The future threat will
likely capitalize on Stuxnet’s innovations by both targeting specific systems and by using
extensive intelligence to develop malware to subversively achieve a kinetic goal. Network
security aimed to provide defense against hackers and general malware will not provide
sufficient protection against attacks similar to Stuxnet.
2.8 Background Summary
Recent SCADA security research aims to mitigate cyber vulnerabilities through
system architecture modifications or additions. Security researchers recommend adding
encryption or attestation devices to protect memory from potential modifications.
Standards and best practices recommend implementing traditional IT security solutions.
Modifying field devices or adding devices may be detrimental to system performance and
may not be feasible for all systems. Network security may not provide necessary
protection against non-networked vectors similar to Stuxnet. Potential improvements upon
current SCADA cyber security shortcomings are efforts that do not affect system operation
and works with a system without modifications or additions to provide protection beyond
the network layer.
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3 Methodology
The ability to verify that a source device (i.e., interface computer) is sending
unmodified firmware to a PLC requires three primary features: (i) the ability to capture
communication data, (ii) the ability to analyze captured data and (iii) the ability to
determine the validity of the firmware. This chapter describes the methodology for
evaluating the effectiveness of the firmware validation tool for these three features.
3.1 Problem Definition
3.1.1 Goals and Hypothesis. Given a known good baseline, the firmware
verification tool is expected to identify firmware modifications. This research postulates
that MD5 hashing and bitwise check routines are insufficient because they do not consider
stateful protocol communication fields. The three methods (i.e., MD5 hash, bitwise check,
and the tool’s verification routine) are examined by comparing a baseline firmware load
against subsequent modified loads.
The primary goals of this research include: effectively capturing and analyzing
firmware upload communications, effectively emulating a PLC to capture firmware loads
independent of a PLC, and verifying firmware captures against known good baselines.
Capturing, analyzing, and verifying firmware communication are the necessary functions
for the firmware verification tool. The emulator functionality provides an implementation
capability with operational feasibility.
3.1.2 Approach. Effective data capture and analysis is demonstrated by capturing
and analyzing data using multiple firmware revisions. Each analysis produces a known
good baseline. Emulating a PLC to independently capture firmware loads is demonstrated
by mirroring each possible firmware version. Verifying firmware captures against known
good baselines is demonstrated by executing the verification routine against representative
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firmware modification test cases. Analysis of the firmware verification tool’s performance
compared to the MD5 hash and bitwise check routines on representative test cases
demonstrates the tool’s relative ability to perform adequte firmware verification.
3.1.3 Baseline Analysis and Emulation. Each firmware upload is executed in an
identical manner. Keeping the loading routine constant for both the tool and the interface
computer reduces the possibility for variations in the data transfer and allows the captured
data to be representative of only the firmware loading process.
3.1.3.1 Baseline Capture and Analysis. During the initial capture and
baseline phase, a firmware load from the interface computer to the PLC is captured.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the passive capture mode setup. The verification tool passively
receives all transferred data. The captured data is then separated into data sent from the
firmware interface computer and reply data sent from the PLC. Note that data from the
interface computer contains the uploaded firmware bytes.
Passive Capture Mode
Interface Computer
Communication and Firmware Data
PLC
Passive
Tap
Baseline Analysis
Known Good 
Firmware 
Capture 
Format
Verification 
Tool
Figure 3.1: Passive capture and baseline analysis setup.
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Baseline creation requires multiple captures. This allows the analysis routine to
identify any stateful protocol packet fields. Stateful protocol packet fields contain
elements that vary depending on data within the packet (e.g., checksum) or stateful
variables (e.g., identification fields). The communication is parsed and variable bytes are
evaluated against typical protocol field patterns [33], [56], [57], [58]. Once differences are
accounted for, a protocol profile is created which contains the communication pattern. The
pattern is then applied to received data to emulate future communication. The baseline is
conducted for each firmware version. Baseline analysis is considered successful if the
routine is able to create a complete baseline profile for captured data. The profile is
considered complete if all stateful protocol packet fields are accounted for. If the baseline
or profile success conditions are not met preventing successful profile creation, then the
tool is unsuccessful.
3.1.3.2 Emulation. Given the baseline profiles, the PLC can be removed from
the communication setup and the emulation environment can be implemented by directly
connecting the interface computer to the verification tool. Figure 3.2 illustrates the
emulator setup. The emulator connects to the interface computer and mimics PLC
messages to initiate a firmware load. The emulator applies the baseline analysis data to the
stored PLC communication data to create valid PLC reply packets. The emulation is
conducted for each test case. The emulator is considered successful if the routine is able to
utilize all available baselines to capture complete firmware loads. A firmware load is
considered complete if the interface computer firmware loading program indicates the
upload is complete.
3.1.4 Firmware Verification. Firmware modification tests are separated into two
distinct types: changes to non stateful protocol data within a capture, and changes to
firmware data within a capture. Note that stateful protocol fields are expected to change
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Figure 3.2: Emulator setup.
within captures, so there is not a class of stateful field modifications. Represented
possibilities for data modification within a capture are data additions, subtractions, or
content modifications. Unmodified data is also used as a control to indicate basic
functionality. Test cases comprise a representative set of these possibilities for
modification, as well as a control for each of the distinct types of modification. Each test
modification and known good baseline is run against a standard MD5 hash function, a
bitwise check function, and the tool’s firmware verification function.
3.1.5 Assumptions and Limitations. Once the tool acquires a baseline, the
emulation routine allows the to tool operate without the need for a PLC. As opposed to
related research outlined in Chapter 2, the tool does not require modification of system
architecture or system devices. It is assumed that the independent functionality, the lack of
system modification, and the execution on a portable laptop makes the tool feasible for
operational use.
The PLC and the interface computer are assumed to begin in a known good state.
Additionally, when capturing, analyzing, and emulating data, it is assumed that the system
is deterministic. Therefore multiple iterations of the same test are expected to produce
identical outcomes.
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The representative test cases are indicative of possible permutations of test cases.
When checking modified firmware or protocol bytes, the location of the modification does
not matter. The validation tool does not take location information into account; it analyzes
only the differences between the baseline and firmware capture. Because the location of
the modification does not matter, a location at any non stateful protocol field position or
any firmware data field position is considered equivalent to any other modification of the
same type. Therefore, a single modification of each class is sufficient to demonstrate other
modifications of the class.
Stateful protocol fields are not tested by the validation routine test cases because they
are assumed valid. The emulator routine testing encompasses the stateful protocol field
testing because it is assumed that the interface computer is adhering to typical
communication standards. This assumption is based on the fact that since the emulator
only sends known packet PLC replies in order, the interface computer has the option of
either replying with a valid successive request, or an invalid successive request. A valid
request adheres to emulator expectations in terms of stateful protocol fields and therefore
stateful fields remain valid. An invalid request may or may not deviate in terms of stateful
protocol fields. Invalid data may either cause an error on the emulator side, which would
indicate possible modification, or the next successive valid PLC reply will be sent, which
would cause an error on the interface computer side, also indicating possible modification.
If the case occurs that the interface computer sends data with incorrect stateful protocol
fields but the emulator is able to send a valid reply and communication continues without
an error on either side, then an error that is not identified occurs. An error such as this is
caused by data corruption on the physical link layer, and not a purposeful modification. A
system limitation is that errors in stateful fields are only accounted for if they cause errors
or modifications to future packets.
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It is possible some fields may change very slowly, and two successive firmware loads
may not capture this behavior. It is assumed that allowing one load in between two
successive firmware loads is sufficient to ensure all stateful protocol fields are manifested.
Consideration for changes with greater delays is discussed in areas for future work.
3.2 Environment
The evaluation environment consists of a standard Windows XP personal computer
and an Allen Bradley FlexLogix 5434 PLC. The personal computer represents the
interface computer designed to upload the RSLogix firmware. The interface computer has
Rockwell Software’s RSLogix 5000 suite installed as well as ControlFLASH 9.00.015,
the firmware loading program.
For the initial baseline capture, the verification tool is connected to the primary
communication line via a passive serial adapter tap, enabling interception of
communication data while preserving communication between the interface computer and
the PLC. For the subsequent emulator and verification phases, the tool is connected to the
interface computer through a serial cable. The PLC and interface computer communicate
using the DF1 protocol. The serial port is configured to correspond with the PLC’s serial
data capabilities, specifically a baud rate of 19200, 8 data bits, no parity, and 1 stop bit.
Firmware versions 15.06.01 or 16.21.12 are firmware load options for the FlexLogix
5434. Baseline firmware files and corresponding binary files are stored in the
ControlFLASH program directory. Each individual ControlFLASH upload is executed
with the same selection method to eliminate variations in the serial data transfer. Data
capture starts when the ControlFLASH program is opened, and ends when the firmware
upload shows complete on the interface computer.
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3.3 Evaluation Technique
3.3.1 Baseline Capture and Analysis Test Cases. The two firmware versions
15.06.01 and 16.21.12 represent the possible versions that can be loaded onto the PLC.
Each capture is run twice to identify stateful protocol fields. Two captures are the fewest
number of captures necessary to identify changes between captures. Each test case
produces a baseline communication profile.
The following steps outline the necessary actions for each test case. First the tool is
placed in passive serial capture mode and the ControlFLASH environment is opened on
the interface computer. The device is connected according to the passive setup as noted in
section 3.1.3.1. The tool is configured for port specifications that match the specifications
outlined in the environment section. Each serial line is chosen based on the corresponding
device’s tap and the data capture is started. Once capture has started, the 1794-L34 PLC is
selected from the ControlFLASH catalog. Then the AB DF1-1, DF1 network is expanded
and location 01, the FlexLogix L34 Processor is selected. Slot 0 is confirmed as the
backplane position. The revision selected corresponds to the test case, and the update is
started. Screenshots of the ControlFLASH firmware loading process are included in
Appendix 5.4. The tool’s data capture routine automatically ends once updating is
complete and all data is received. The tool is then put in capture baseline and analysis
mode. The saved capture data files created during passive capture are selected. The tool
produces a corresponding baseline. Capture and analysis test cases consist of the possible
firmware load options:
1. Version 15.06.01 to version 15.06.01 baseline capture followed by a second version
15.06.01 to version 15.06.01 baseline capture and an analysis of the two loads
producing a corresponding baseline.
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2. Version 15.06.01 to version 16.21.12 baseline capture followed by a second version
15.06.01 to version 16.21.12 baseline capture and an analysis of the two loads
producing a corresponding baseline.
3. Version 16.21.12 to version 16.21.12 baseline capture followed by a second version
16.21.12 to version 16.21.12 baseline capture and an analysis of the two loads
producing a corresponding baseline.
4. Version 16.21.12 to version 15.06.01 baseline capture followed by a second version
16.21.12 to version 15.06.01 baseline capture and an analysis of the two loads
producing a corresponding baseline.
3.3.2 Emulation Test Cases. The four baselines created during baseline capture
and analysis test case execution are used for the emulation test cases. This tests the tool’s
ability to emulate each loading option for updating the PLC.
The following steps outline the necessary actions for each test case. First the tool is
placed in passive serial capture mode and the ControlFLASH environment is opened on
the interface computer. The device is connected according to the emulator setup as
outlined in section 3.1.3.2. The tool is configured for port specifications that match the
specifications outlined in the environment section. Once emulation has started, the
1794-L34 PLC is selected from the ControlFLASH catalog. Then the AB DF1-1, DF1
network is expanded and location 01, the FlexLogix L34 Processor is selected. Slot 0 is
confirmed as the backplane position. The revision selected corresponds to the test case,
and the update is started. The tool’s data emulation routine automatically ends once
updating is complete and all data is received. Emulation test cases consist of the possible
firmware load options:
1. Version 15.06.01 to version 15.06.01 emulation
2. Version 15.06.01 to version 16.21.12 emulation
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3. Version 16.21.12 to version 16.21.12 emulation
4. Version 16.21.12 to version 15.06.01 emulation
3.3.3 Firmware Verification Routine Test Cases. The firmware verification routine
test cases are run with each of the three verification routines: (i) MD5 hash, (ii) firmware
bitwise check, and (iii) the tool’s verification routine. The test case modifications are
single byte modifications.
The following steps outline the necessary actions for each test case for the MD5
routine. The MD5 hash function is the built in MD5 checksum in the HxD program [59].
The test file and known good files are opened in the editor, and the MD5 checksum routine
is selected from the analysis file option for each file. A resulting checksum is produced for
each file. The test case checksum is compared to the known good checksum.
The following steps outline the necessary actions for test case for the firmware
bitwise check routine. The firmware bitwise check is a built-in routine in the verification
tool. The tool is placed in bitwise firmware check mode. The captured file path and the
known good firmware file path are selected. The tool’s output indicates if the firmware
data is or is not contained within the capture.
The following steps outline the necessary actions for each test case for the tool’s
verification routine. The tool is placed in validate serial capture mode. The corresponding
baseline file path and the test capture file path are selected. The tool’s output indicates if
the firmware is or is not equivalent.
3.3.3.1 Control Test Cases. Control test cases are unmodified firmware
captures to test proper verification functionality. Baseline files used are respective
baselines for the corresponding verification method. The MD5 hash verification and the
tool’s verification method use the delineated baselines whereas the bitwise check method
uses the baseline firmware file binary.
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1. No modification - version 15.06.01 to version 15.06.01 baseline versus a good
15.06.01 to 15.06.01 capture
2. No modification - version 15.06.01 to version 16.21.12 baseline versus a good
15.06.01 to 16.21.12 capture
3. No modification - version 16.21.12 to version 16.21.12 baseline versus a good
16.21.12 to 16.21.12 capture
4. No modification - version 16.21.12 to version 15.06.01 baseline versus a good
16.21.12 to 15.06.01 capture
3.3.3.2 Modification Test Cases. Modification test cases consist of single byte
modifications to create a lengthwise change or a bitwise content change. Baseline files
used are respective baselines for the corresponding verification method. The MD5 hash
verification and the tool’s verification method use the version 15.06.01 to version 15.06.01
baseline whereas the bitwise check method uses the 15.06.01 firmware file binary.
1. Lengthwise modification - baseline versus added single byte to the end of the
firmware data embedded within a packet of the capture
2. Lengthwise modification - baseline versus subtracted single byte from the end of the
firmware data embedded within a packet of the capture
3. Lengthwise modification - baseline versus added single byte to the end of the last
captured data packet
4. Lengthwise modification - baseline versus subtracted single byte from the end of the
last capture data packet
5. Bitwise modification - baseline versus modified single byte in the firmware data
embedded within a packet of the capture
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6. Bitwise modification - baseline versus modified single byte in the last captured data
packet
3.3.4 Evaluation of Firmware Modification. Each test case outcome is either
successful or unsuccessful at identifying modifications. The baseline capture and
emulation tests consist of four test cases. The baseline is successful if the tool creates a
baseline from captured data. The emulation is successful if the tool captures a firmware
load.
Firmware modification test cases consist of four control and six modified cases
executed by the three verification routines for a total of thirty outcomes. A successful
outcome is the correct indication of the absence of modification for the control cases, and
the presence of modification for the modified cases.
3.4 Methodology Summary
This chapter provides the methodology for evaluating the firmware verification tool.
The data capture and analysis capabilities of the tool are examined to demonstrate the
tool’s ability to identify modified firmware and function independently of a PLC. The
effectiveness is tested using a comparative analysis of the verification tool’s routine to
MD5 and bitwise check data integrity check routines. The test cases consist of
representative modifications demonstrating possible modification classes.
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4 Analysis and Results
4.1 Tool Development
A typical ControlFLASH firmware load involves selecting a PLC and corresponding
available firmware version, and then proceeding through a firmware upload process. For
each firmware file, the process first sends an update command, waits for the PLC to power
cycle, sends the firmware data, and then waits for a success or failure response and a final
power cycle. The tool baselines and emulates the firmware loading process. For the initial
baseline phase, the tool captures data from the interface computer to the PLC. When the
baseline has been captured, the tool runs an analysis on the captured communication and
creates an emulation profile. Subsequently, the tool can connect directly to an interface
computer to download and independently verify firmware. The tool was developed in C#
using Visual Studio 2008 and executes on the Windows 7 64 bit operating system. The
tool requires two serial ports or serial port adapters on the host computer to capture serial
data.
4.1.1 Protocol Patterns. The verification tool requires adequate functionality to
capture and interpret data from Allen-Bradley devices utilizing the DF1 full duplex
protocol. Patterns are applied to a known good PLC capture, identifying fields to create a
baseline profile.
4.1.1.1 Identifying Protocol Fields and Patterns. The tool employs a brute
force optimization technique for identifying the protocol fields and patterns. First, start
fields are used to group received data into packet structures, separating each block of data
by start field. The start field identification algorithm begins with the first byte in the
capture as the initial field and seeks to successively increase field length while maintaining
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Example Packet Field Blocks 
Figure 4.1: Example packet fields.
field occurrence rate. The field that optimizes the function is chosen as the start field. The
capture is then divided into packets beginning with the identified start field.
Once grouped, the checksum field is accounted for by searching packets right to left
for mismatches. Mismatches are identified as fields that change between the two baseline
captures. If a mismatched field is found, the checksum identification algorithm computes
a checksum of the packet data and compares it against the mismatched field value. Note
that the algorithm computes checksums of various substrings within a packet as start bytes
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may not be included within the checksum computation. If the computed value and field
value match for all packets in the capture, the field is identified as a checksum field.
Finally, other field mismatches are checked, such as the transaction number. The
algorithm for remaining mismatches identifies fields by searching for the field value in the
corresponding interface computer request packet. If a field of equivalent value is found at
the same location for all mismatches within a capture, then the mismatch is grouped with
the corresponding equivalent value. The protocol parser class diagrams are included in
Appendix Figure C.3.
The contents of a firmware load including protocol and firmware bytes are visually
represented in Figure 4.1. The figure shows example packet fields and their locations in
an example capture. The stateful data fields applicable to DF1 are a two byte transaction
number for packet identification and a block check character (BCC) checksum field. An
escape byte of 0x10 is also used in the event end bytes occur within the data field [56].
The interface computer sends polling packets during power up while the PLC does not
send packets until the power cycle is complete. Figure 4.2 identifies protocol and
firmware bytes within a firmware capture. Each pixel represents a single byte in the
capture. Approximate regions marked are connection initialization and connection close
communications. Firmware upload data and protocol upload data is indicated as well,
illustrating the approximate location and amount of overhead protocol data necessary for a
firmware upload. The relative density of protocol bytes and the size of the file depict the
potential for modification. The profile creation class diagrams are included in Appendix
Figures C.2 and C.3. Pseudocode for tool protocol identification algorithms are included
in Appendix A.
4.1.2 Data Emulation. After the baseline is created, the tool can independently
download and verify firmware data and communication data sent from an interface
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Actual Firmware Load Capture (v.15) 
Firmware Loading 
Process Key 
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Firmware Data Protocol Data 
Figure 4.2: Protocol and firmware bytes in a version 15 capture.
computer. The tool uses the baseline profile to emulate the PLC, replaying the PLC’s data
with protocol modifications to communicate with and download firmware from the
interface computer. The tool iteratively sends complete packets.
The emulator seeks to imitate the ControlFLASH loading process. Figure 4.3 shows
a PLC capture excerpt after parsing, delineated by packet. Each pixel represents a single
byte. The raw data as depicted in Figure 4.2 is analyzed and parsed into the displayed
packets. The various field delineations are represented. During the connection
initialization phase, the PLC communicates its model number and firmware revision
number. The interface computer does not register a list of PLCs so the emulator can reply
with any valid field values. Once loading begins, successive packets sent are
acknowledgement packets to indicate successful receipt of data from the interface
computer. When all data is received the PLC sends indication upon power cycle
completion and closes the firmware upload connection.
The emulator allows the tool to be used independently of a PLC. Without the
emulator feature, all captures require the tool to passively observe firmware loads between
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an interface computer and a PLC, which does not necessarily prevent malicious firmware
from installing on the PLC. Independent data capture allows verification before
installation, increasing the difficulty of a successful firmware attack. The PLC emulator
class diagrams are included in Appendix Figure C.4
Initialize Connection 
Parsed PLC Communication Profile 
Packet Block Detail (v.15) 
Verify Successful Install 
… 
Verify Packet Receipt 
Close Connection 
Packet start field 
Key 
Packet ID field 
Escape Byte 
Unchanging Data 
Checksum Field 
Figure 4.3: Subset of blocks created by the parsing and analysis process of a version 15
PLC data capture.
4.1.3 Firmware Verification. The two baseline firmware captures may have
differing fields, if the protocol includes any stateful fields. The DF1 protocol, as outlined,
does include stateful fields. Figure 4.4 illustrates example firmware capture baseline and
verification test cases. Fields that are different from one baseline capture to the other are
noted, and these fields are acceptable deviations for the capture in question as well.
Escape bytes are also accounted for, if used. Beyond these expected deviations, the
presence of mismatches between fields that are not baseline deviation fields, including
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lengthwise and bitwise mismatches, demonstrate the capture contains invalid data. The
firmware verification classes are included in Appendix Figure C.5.
Accepted Firmware Capture Deviation 
Example 
Baseline captures 
Baseline deviations 
Lengthwise 
Modification 
Unaccepted Firmware Capture Deviation 
Examples 
Baseline 
Bitwise 
Modification 
Baseline 
Figure 4.4: Example firmware capture verification cases.
4.2 Results
The results demonstrate the tool’s successful baseline, analysis, and emulator
capabilities. The tool’s firmware verification routine successfully identified modified and
unmodified firmware captures. Images of tool test case modifications are included in
Appendix D and images of the tool performing test cases are included in Appendix C.6.
4.2.1 Baseline Capture and Analysis Results and Emulation Results. Each
baseline capture and analysis routine test case successfully captured two loads and created
38
a baseline profile without discrepancies or errors. The emulator successfully captured
firmware loads utilizing each baseline version without discrepancies or errors.
4.2.2 Firmware Modification. Success and failure for each test case verification
routine are noted in the Figure 4.5. The tool’s verification routine correctly identified
modified and unmodified firmware. The MD5 routine failed on all cases because it did not
correctly identify control cases as unmodified. Bitwise check correctly identified the
presence of firmware data bytes within a capture, but failed to recognize additional
firmware data bytes, or protocol modifications.
Test Case MD5 Bitwise Check Tool Verification 
Control 1 Failure Success Success 
Control 2 Failure Success Success 
Control 3 Failure Success Success 
Control 4 Failure Success Success 
Firmware Data Addition Failure Failure Success 
Firmware Data Subtraction Failure Success Success 
Protocol Data Addition Failure Failure Success 
Protocol Data Subtraction Failure Failure Success 
Firmware Data Modification Failure Success Success 
Protocol Data Modification Failure Failure Success 
Figure 4.5: Firmware verification routine results.
4.3 Analysis
The tool successfully verified unmodified captures, and correctly detected each
modified capture. Additionally, the baseline capture and analysis successfully produced
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baseline profiles, and the emulator successfully imitated a PLC during firmware
verification.
4.3.1 MD5 Hash, Bitwise Check, and Tool Verification Routines. The MD5 routine
failed on all cases. Due to changing stateful fields, two functionally equivalent captures
produce different hash values. The bitwise check routine failed to detect lengthwise
additions and protocol modifications. These failures were anticipated, and demonstrate the
shortcomings of a hash function or simple bitwise check. Indeed, checking captured data
to ensure it contains firmware bytes is inadequate. The bitwise check case failures
demonstrate that a verification routine must have protocol knowledge or it cannot perform
a sufficiently thorough verification. The tool’s firmware verification function correctly
identifies the addition because it checks the firmware data as well as the protocol data.
The emulator ensures that packets are sent and received in the same manner as the
baseline capture. It is critical that the tool verifies that the same firmware bytes are sent in
a manner identical to the baseline. Without this verification, it is possible for an attacker to
send packets that contain the same bytes as the firmware, but embed malicious data in the
packet’s protocol bytes. The captured data will still contain all firmware bytes, passing a
bitwise check to see if the transfer contains all firmware data, but modifications of this
type will fail a check that includes protocol verification. The bitwise firmware check test
cases demonstrate the importance of the tool’s emulation and verification functions -
allowing not only the firmware data to be verified, but the communication protocol data as
well.
4.4 Discussion on Limitations
4.4.1 Platform Limitations. The tool was tested and developed on a Windows 7
platform and requires two serial ports, or USB to serial adapters. This hardware
requirement may be a limiting factor. Not all PLCs have serial firmware upload
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capabilities. Some PLCs may utilize proprietary loading devices or other communication
standards as well. Additionally, The tool executes on a typical personal computer, which
has the same vulnerabilities as the interface computer. Though it has the benefit of
providing external verification to the interface computer’s data transfer, the computer the
tool is on may still be at risk of compromise. This risk can be mitigated if the tool is
executed on a platform that has memory or processing constraints, limiting the possibility
for platform modification (e.g., embedded device).
The tool may be detectable if the attacker is aware of the tool and has compromised
the interface computer. The tool’s emulator does not emulate the same timing of packets
sent from the PLC, and the tool only responds in a manner imitating original PLC
responses. It may not respond correctly to packets it does not expect, and an attacker can
use this to their advantage. Note that an attack would have to detect these differences in a
subtle manner, sending an unmodified load to the tool while continuing to send modified
firmware to the PLC. However, the tool can still capture any differences when loading
firmware directly to the PLC by using the tool’s passive serial capture capability. Any
attack would require extensive knowledge of the tool.
4.4.2 Development Limitations. Protocol pattern detection relies on the computer
analyzing the data and deriving potential fields, based on the data. Although sufficient for
the tested firmware, it is possible that these patterns may not always provide a conclusive
profile for other protocol implementations. The current functionality is not a complete
representation of all possible patterns that exist in today’s protocols. The development
focused on the DF1 protocol; further development is necessary before the tool can be
considered platform independent.
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4.5 Analysis Summary
Using the evaluation technique, the tool’s baseline analysis and emulation routines
were tested with firmware uploads, successfully creating baseline profiles and emulating
PLC traffic to capture firmware loading data. The firmware verification routine
successfully identified modification or no modification on all test cases. The MD5 routine
failed on all cases due to inability to identify unmodified data, and the bitwise check failed
to detect firmware data additions and protocol modifications. The tool verification
routine’s success rate demonstrates its tailored ability to recognize modified firmware.
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5 Conclusions and Future Work
5.1 Conclusions
Critical infrastructure cyber security research and development is currently focused
on the network layer. Critical infrastructure protection standards and best practices seek to
reduce the potential for network attacks originating from the public internet because of the
increasingly online nature of SCADA systems [54]. Many proposed and developed tools
add encryption or intrusion detection systems to SCADA networks through field device
modification or by a bump-in-the-wire device addition. While these tools may be
successful at auditing malicious or atypical network traffic, all fail to mitigate malware
originating from potentially trusted or non-network layer ingress vectors. Escaping the
electronic perimeter mentality, this research seeks to expand SCADA system security to
provide integrity and security below the network layer. PLC firmware is a highly
vulnerable target because of its capability to control a PLC, lack of access control security,
and lack of auditability.
The tool presented is a firmware emulation and validation tool intended to audit
firmware loads from an interface computer to a PLC at the last externally electronically
modifiable point. The tool is a novel application, designed to be used as a malware
prevention and detection device for PLC firmware. The tool increases SCADA system
security by creating a closed system with respect to the PLC firmware by validating inputs
from the interface computer; once initiated in a secure state the PLC remains in a secure
state as long as firmware inputs are valid. The tool can be set up to work with multiple
PLCs, and once the communication baseline has been created, the tool operates
independently of a PLC. The tool’s ability to check both firmware and communication
data increases the extent of firmware integrity assurance beyond that of a MD5 hash or
simple bitwise firmware data checking routine.
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The tool was developed and tested on a Windows personal computer. The tool
successfully executed all test cases which consisted of testing the tool’s emulation and
verification routines with the Allen-Bradley FlexLogix 5434 PLC and Rockwell
Software’s ControlFLASH firmware upload program. The tool successfully demonstrates
a proof of concept for a new paradigm of SCADA system cyber security tools focused on
field device security as opposed to electronic perimeter security.
5.2 Impact
This tool is intended as a starting point for the development of a SCADA cyber
security toolkit that focuses on vulnerabilities beyond the network layer. The tool is meant
primarily for malicious cyber attack deterrence and detection. While the network layer
does present possible cyber attack points, limiting defense to the network layer will not
provide complete security. This tool seeks to expand the SCADA cyber defense toolkit by
providing PLC centric security. Specifically, the adaptable baseline and PLC emulation
functionality is operationally useful as it allows resource and manpower reduction while
still providing firmware integrity assurance. Checking every PLC in the field is usually
infeasible due to the large quantity and remote locations of PLCs. However, checking
every firmware loading computer is a simpler task as these computers are likely more
accessible. Instead of checking PLCs, checking every computer that loads PLC firmware
is an operationally feasible problem and grants an increased degree of confidence that
PLCs do not contain modified firmware.
Regardless of injection point, this tool captures firmware modifications implemented
through the interface computer’s firmware loading mechanism. The change from network
centric security to tailored device security demonstrates a paradigm shift. Consider, for
example, the scenario outlined in Figure 5.1. Vectors that utilize a non networked ingress
point gain access to the SCADA system components including the interface computer.
The interface computer has access to the PLC. Additional device security at the PLC layer
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audits data from sources inside the network security perimeter, detecting potential
modifications. The tool presented exemplifies how this new paradigm can be applied to
increase SCADA system and critical infrastructure security.
Device Centric 
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Public Internet
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Removable 
Media
PLC 
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Ingress Points
Verification 
Tool
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Figure 5.1: Device centric security.
5.2.1 Impact to Manufacturers. PLC manufacturers are considered trusted actors.
Published SCADA security standards assume that software and hardware from a trusted
company must be trusted as well. This can be dangerous when PLC technicians connect to
a third party server to download firmware or software updates. Malicious modifications to
the manufacturer’s firmware version propagate to all end users who download firmware
updates. PLC manufacturing companies can benefit from firmware verification because it
grants them the ability to baseline and verify their own versions on a reoccurring basis.
Additionally, the PLC manufacturers can produce a baseline profile for end users to
compare against their own baseline. If the known good is available for inspection by the
community, any incidents of detected firmware modification can be more quickly
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identified and reported, improving speed of mitigation and reducing potential malicious
effects.
5.2.2 Impact for Industry. The majority of critical infrastructure is privatized, so
the benefit of any proposed security measures must outweigh the cost if it is to be
implemented. Expensive tools, developmental tools, or tools that require system
reconfiguration can be difficult to justify on an already functioning system.
There have been no documented critical infrastructure cyber attacks targeting the
United States. However, waiting until an attack to implement security measures
retroactively could be dangerous considering the potential kinetic effects of a successful
attack. A toolkit of simple but comprehensive tools focused on protecting SCADA system
field devices that are relatively inexpensive and easily implementable would benefit the
critical infrastructure industry.
5.2.3 Impact for Security Professionals. SCADA security best practices do not
currently advocate any tools for field device security, and security teams such as
ICS-CERT currently lack tools for SCADA specific malware detection. There is a need
for SCADA specific malware prevention and detection tools. The firmware verification
tool’s primary use is to prevent malicious firmware from being uploaded onto a PLC.
However, the tool can also be used as a response mechanism if a known good baseline is
available. The tool can be used to check all possible interface computers and identify
which, if any, computers were compromised. The tool’s portability and versatility make it
a prime candidate for operational implementation. Checking each computer versus
checking each PLC reduces the problem complexity, decreasing system recovery time for
security teams. Additionally, verifying each interface computer is sending unmodified
firmware increases the level of security assurance with respect to PLC devices. This type
of tailored assurance is not currently provided by network security tools. With further
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development, this tool could be instrumental in preventing malicious PLC firmware
modifications on a variety of PLCs.
5.2.4 Potential Implementations. The tool has a variety of potential uses. The tool
can be used to verify firmware integrity before applying firmware updates to PLCs. HMIs
can also be checked to ensure they transfer unmodified firmware. The tool can audit
communication between a PLC and interface computer during an update to identify
potential malicious inclusions. If malware modifies firmware data, then the tool can
pinpoint the infected computer. Additionally the tool’s passive tap ability can capture
serial communication data and log this data for future auditing.
5.2.5 Potential Weaknesses. An attacker attempting to circumvent the tool may
discover its presence by checking packet response times. The tool runs faster than an
actual PLC due to increased processor speed. Additionally, the tool only responds in a
way as to mimic the PLC’s expected response. An attacker could determine if the tool is
being used by sending unexpected firmware packets and receiving an incorrect response.
Note that any deviations beyond expected field differences will still be detected during a
firmware load. Additionally, this tool does not account for firmware modifications that are
manifested in ways other than through the firmware loading interface.
5.3 Future Work
5.3.1 Increased Testing. Testing was limited to one PLC model and one interface
computer. Further testing on different models and manufacturers is needed to examine
portability. Testing modified firmware also presents limiting factors. Allowing greater
delays between loads may produce different baseline data. Currently a one upload delay is
used; this delay can be lengthened in future testing.
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5.3.2 Improved System Compatibility. Follow on work for firmware verification
includes expanding functionality to work with multiple PLCs and SCADA system
implementations. This includes research and development on various PLC protocols to
create new protocol analysis patterns as well as adding functionality for system setups that
use non-serial loading mechanisms. Ethernet is the next logical capture interface.
Additionally, checksum routines are currently limited to the BCC function; cyclic
redundancy checking or other routines would provide pertinent added functionality.
5.3.3 Increased Tool Security. The verification tool’s platform can be modified to
add security to the tool platform itself. The tool executes on a personal computer, so it is
vulnerable to attack as well. To increase the tool’s security, the tool can be ported to an
embedded device, or used in conjunction with a field programmable gate array. These
changes increase the tool’s security by limiting its memory and computation capabilities.
5.3.4 Potential to Test All Possible PLCs. The emulator can be further developed
to have greater functionality. The emulator currently only replays PLC data, so from the
perspective of the interface computer, it appears that the same PLC is connected each
time. The PLC identification response can be updated so that various PLC identification
values are sent. If an attack is targeted at a specific PLC, then modifying these
identification values may help uncover malicious system modifications. Iterating through
possible values may trigger specific logic conditions. The tool can masquerade as the full
range of PLCs without requiring increased equipment or resources by changing
identification values.
5.3.5 Traffic Generation. The tool also has potential for PLC traffic generation as
a penetration testing/fuzzing tool, or as a node in a honeynet setup. The tool applies
patterns to captured data to generate valid packets used during a firmware load. The tool
can be modified to generate PLC traffic for these alternative applications as well. The tool
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can capture and baseline data other than a firmware load, giving it different protocol
knowledge and different replay ability. The tool can appear to be a variety of different
systems, depending on the emulator baseline, without requiring additional resources for
each new setup. Functionality can also be added to generate packets with minor deviations
adhering to protocol rules by using evolutionary algorithms. Generated traffic can identify
malicious attack or reconnaissance attempts. The tool can also generate packets designed
for testing PLCs or other field devices. When used with a test PLC, the tool can iterate
through valid packet combinations to uncover potentially insecure PLC actions or failure
conditions.
5.3.6 Alternative PLC Layer Security. The tool can also be used to check
communication data in settings other than firmware loads, such as during a logic program
load or a program block value check. For example, Stuxnet used a modified DLL to hide a
value stored on the PLC from the HMI software and end user [22]. If the function block
value check communication data was baselined after initial install, the Stuxnet
modifications would be detected.
5.4 Concluding Remarks
Creating security tools specific to SCADA systems is necessary to maintain and build
trust in critical infrastructure systems. The primary goal of validating firmware extends
beyond ensuring known good firmware is loaded onto a PLC – it also helps create a closed
system with respect to the PLC. The PLC has the highest level of local control over a
SCADA system, so it is critical that controllers are verified on basic hardware and
software levels before security measures can be effectively applied to higher levels.
Firmware is the lowest electronically modifiable level of many PLCs. Indeed, firmware
validation is the first logical step when considering electronic security.
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The firmware verification tool captures serial data during firmware uploads and
verifies captured upload data against a known good baseline. The tool has PLC emulation
functionality and can analyze firmware without the presence of a PLC. While serial data
capture, data verification, and emulation are not new ideas individually, the tool combines
these ideas in a novel manner tailored to SCADA system security. The verification tool
offers a novel approach tailored for SCADA security because it requires no system
modifications or additions and does not affect the production system. Additionally,
implementing the verification tool does not introduce attack input vectors to the PLC
because the tool it is not physically wired to exchange communication with the PLC. The
verification tool is a viable option for increasing PLC firmware security.
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Appendix A: Typical ControlFLASH Firmware Load Process
The following screenshots outline a typical ControlFLASH firmware load process to
the Allen-Bradley FlexLogix 5434 PLC.
Figure A.1: Open ControlFLASH.
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Figure A.2: Select PLC type.
Figure A.3: Select PLC from device network.
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Figure A.4: Enter PLC designator number.
Figure A.5: Select firmware revision number.
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Figure A.6: Begin upload.
Figure A.7: Uploading in progress.
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Figure A.8: Power cycle upon upload.
Figure A.9: Successful Install.
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Appendix B: Pseudocode
The following algorithms abstract the tool’s routines and functionality.
B.1 Data Capture
Input: plcS erialLine, computerS erialLine
Output: plcData, computerData
Thread plcThread = new Thread(plcS erialLine, plcData)
Thread computerThread = new Thread(computerS erialLine, computerData)
Thread Function():
begin
while receiving do
if myS erialLine.hasData then
myData.add(myS erialLine.data)
end
end
end
Figure B.1: Data Capture Algorithm
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B.2 Protocol Analysis
Input: captureSet plcData[2], captureSet computerData[2]
Output: protocolPro f ile
foreach captureSet dataS et do group captures into packets for both the PLC and
computer
GroupIntoBlocks(dataS et.capture1, dataS et.capture2)
end
SavePackets()
SaveMismatches()
Figure B.2: Protocol Analysis Algorithm
Input: captureSet plcData[2], captureSet computerData[2]
Output:
GroupIntoBlocks(capture1, capture2):
begin
List possibleValues = FindMostUsedByteValues(capture1)
ByteList startBytes = possibleValues[0]
int usageDensity = FindNumOccurencesInCapture(capture1, startBytes)
optimal = false
while !optimal do create a start byte string of maximal length
List possibleValues = FindMostUsedByteValues(capture1, startBytes)
startBytes = startBytes + possibleValues[0]
newDensity = startBytes.length +
FindNumOccurencesInCapture(capture1, startBytes).normalize
if newDensity greater than usageDensity then
usageDensity = newDensity
else
optimal = true
startBytes.removeLast()
end
end
dataS et.setPacketBlocks(startBytes)
end
Figure B.3: Protocol Analysis Block Grouping Algorithm
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Input: captureSet plcData[2], captureSet computerData[2]
Output:
escapeByte = CheckForEscapeByte(plcData)
ResolvePLCMismatches():
begin
foreach packet1, packet2 in plcData[1], plcData[2] do resolve mismatches
if packet1 != packet2 and !checksum then
checksum = CheckMismatchAsChecksum(packet1, packet2,
escapeByte)
if checksum then resolve for all packets
SetChecksumForAllPackets(plcData[1], plcData[2])
end
elsecheck for data in equiv computer packet
CheckIfRepeatedFromComputerBlocks(computerData[1], packet1)
end
end
end
Figure B.4: Protocol Analysis Mismatch Resolving Algorithm
Input: plcData
Output: bool escapeByte
CheckForEscapeByte(plcData):
begin
List possibleValues = FindMostUsedByteValues(plcData)
foreach possibleValues in plcData do see if escape strings work
if plcData[1].applyEscapeByte(escapeByte) is more similar to
plcData[2].applyEscapeByte(escapeByte) then
return true
end
end
return false
end
Figure B.5: Protocol Analysis Escape Byte Check Algorithm
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B.3 PLC Emulator
Input: computerS erialLine, protocolPro f ile
Output: computerData
while receiving do
computerData.addData(computerS erialLine.data)
if computerData.receivedFullPacket then a packet has been received
computerS erialLine.write(produceNextPacket(protocolPro f ile,
computerData))
end
end
return computerData
Figure B.6: PLC Emulator Algorithm
Input: protocolPro f ile, computerData
Output: packet
ProduceNextPacket(protocolPro f ile, computerData):
begin
protocolPro f ile.resolveMismatchesSoFar(computerData)
packet = protocolPro f ile.nextPacket()
protocolPro f ile.applyChecksum(packet)
protocolPro f ile.applyEscapeBytes(packet)
return packet
end
Figure B.7: PLC Emulator Packet Production Algorithm
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B.4 Firmware Verifier
Input: baselineData[2], receivedData
Output: valid
List baselineMismatches = getMismatches(baselineData[1], baselineData[2])
List newMismatches = getMismatches(baselineData[1], receivedData)
if newMismatches == null then function returned error
valid = false
return valid
end
foreach mismatch in newMismatches do ensure all mismatches are accounted for
if !baselineMismatches.contains(mismatch) then mismatch not expected
valid = false
end
end
return valid
Figure B.8: Firmware Verification Algorithm
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Input: data1, data2
Output: mismatches[]
getMismatches(data1, data2):
begin
prevByte1 = data1.readByte()
prevByte2 = data2.readByte()
location = 1
while !data1.atEnd do
if data2.atEnd then not enough bytes in data2
return null
end
byte1 = data1.readByte()
byte2 = data2.readByte()
if byte1 != byte2 then data mismatch
if prevByte1 == escapeByte && byte1 == escapeByte && prevByte1
!= prevByte2 then
data2.position–
location–
prevByte1 = byte1
end
else if previousByte2 == escapeByte && byte2 == escapeByte &&
prevByte1 != prevByte2 then
data1.position–
location–
prevByte2 = byte2
end
else
mismatches.add(location)
end
location++
prevByte1 = byte1
prevByte2 = byte2
end
if !data2.atEnd then too many bytes in data2
return null
end
end
Figure B.9: Firmware Verification Mismatch Algorithm
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Appendix C: Tool Class Diagrams
The following class diagrams display the tool’s code classes and their members and
functions.
C.1 Main Class and Helper Classes
error
Static Class
public
throwError() : void
helperFunctions
Static Class
public
byteArrayToString() : string
closeStreams() : void
compareByteArrays() : bool
convertStringToByteList() : LinkedList<byte>
countOccurences() : int
displayOutput() : void
displaySingleLineOutput() : void
getConsoleFileInput() : string
getEscapedData() : LinkedList<byte>
getInput() : string
getSubList() : byte[]
getYorN() : bool
openBlocks() : LinkedList<packetBlock>
readByte() : byte
removeLinkedListBytes() : void
restoreEscapedData() : LinkedList<byte>
mainConsole
Static Class
public
closeProgram() : void
Main() : void
private
getSelection() : int
runTest() : void
writeIntroduction() : void
outputImage
Class
public
finishImage() : void
outputImage() (+ 1 overload)
setPixel() : void
setPixelLine() : void
private
currentCol : int
currentRow : int
entry : int
image : Bitmap
initializeImage() : void
length : int
pixelsPerEntry : int
saveImage() : void
saveName : string
width : int
Figure C.1: Main Class and Helper Classes.
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C.2 Passive Serial Capture Classes
plcImitatorObserver
Class
public
exit() : void
plcImitatorObserver()
runThreads() : void
private
captureFilePath : string
compy : passiveObserver
compyObserver : Thread
fwFilePath : string
getBaud() : int
getCaptureFilePath() : void
getDataBits() : int
getForwardData() : bool
getFwFilePath() : void
getObserver() : void
getParity() : string
getParseExistingFile() : bool
getPortName() : string
getStopBits() : float
numObserverThreads : int[]
outputWriter : dataWriter
plc : passiveObserver
plcObserver : Thread
runCapture : bool
passiveObserver
Class
public
getRunning() : bool
passiveObserver()
quit() : void
runReceive() : void
setBaud() : void
setDataBits() : void
setForward() : void
setParity() : void
setPort() : void
setStopBits() : void
writeOutData() : void
private
baudRate : int
buffer : StringBuilder
checkTime() : void
comPort : string
dataBits : int
dataQueue : Queue<byte>
forwardData : bool
lastUsedTime : DateTime
myValue : int
parityBit : Parity
port : SerialPort
running : bool
signalPortInUse : bool
stop : StopBits
writer : dataWriter
dataWriter
Class
public
dataWriter() (+ 1 overload)
getCaptureFilePath() : string
getData() : void
getRunning() : bool
runWriter() : void
writeOutData() : void
private
captureFilePath : string
captureFileStream : FileStream
captureWriter : StreamWriter
messages : Queue<string>
openStreamArray : LinkedList<Stream>
running : bool
signalDoneWriting : bool
threadBuffers : StringBuilder[]
Figure C.2: Passive Serial Capture Classes.
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C.3 Serial Capture Analysis and Profile Creation Classes
protocolProfile
Class
public
checkForRepeatedMessages() : void
createProfile() : bool
getCaptureFileName() : string
getComputerBlocks() : LinkedList<packetBlock>
getPLCBlocks() : LinkedList<packetBlock>
openStoredBlocks() : void
protocolProfile() (+ 1 overload)
private
analyzeErrorChecking() : void
analyzePLCtoComputerFile() : void
anyMismatchesLeft() : bool
computerBlocks1 : LinkedList<packetBlock>
computerBlocks2 : LinkedList<packetBlock>
computerCaptures : FileStream[]
correctIndividualMismatches() : void
getEndByte() : LinkedList<byte>
getMismatchReplaceIndex() : int
getPLCblockMismatches() : void
groupIntoBlocks() : void
initializeProfile() : void
openCorrections() : void
openStreamArray : LinkedList<Stream>
plcBlocks1 : LinkedList<packetBlock>
plcBlocks2 : LinkedList<packetBlock>
plcCaptures : FileStream[]
preset : bool
presetEscapeByte : byte
saveCompletedBlocks() : void
setBlocks() : void
setEscapeByte() : void
writeStreamBlocks() : void
parserAnalysis
Static Class
public
addArrayValues() : int[]
arraySum() : int
averageValue() : float
findMaxIndex() : int
getNumWithinOccurenceRange() : LinkedList<byte>
median() : int
standardDeviation() : float
packetBlock
Class
public
addRepeat() : void
applyChecksumToData() : LinkedList<byte>
applyMismatchesToData() : LinkedList<byte>
checkMismatchAsChecksum() : void
checkMismatchAsComputerBlockMatch() : bool[]
checkSubArray() : bool
compareBlocks() : bool
escaping() : bool
findLikelyEscapeValue() : byte[]
findMismatchFields() : void
getChecksum() : checksum
getDataBytes() : byte[]
getEndBlockLength() : int
getEndString() : string
getEscapeByte() : byte
getEscapedData() : LinkedList<byte>
getLastRequiredIndex() : int
getMismatchArray() : bool[]
getMismatchList() : LinkedList<plcCompMismatch>
getNewData() : byte[]
getNextMismatch() : plcCompMismatch
getOffsetOfChecksumFromEnd() : int
getRepeats() : int
getStartBlockLength() : int
getStartField() : byte[]
getStartString() : string
getSubarray() : byte[]
hasMoreMismatches() : bool
Length() : int
packetBlock() (+ 1 overload)
removeChecksumMismatch() : void
removePLCCompyMismatch() : void
resetMismatches() : void
setChecksum() : void
setEndField() : void
setEscapeByte() : void
setMismatchList() : void
ToString() : string
tryOverwriteData() : bool
private
dataField : byte[]
dataFieldString : ArrayList
dataLength : int
endField : byte[]
errorChecksum : checksum
escapeByte : byte
escapedDataFieldString : LinkedList<byte>
mismatch : bool[]
mismatchList : LinkedList<plcCompMismatch>
myBlockNumber : int
numTimesDisplayed : int
overwrittenIndex : int
receivedData : LinkedList<byte>
startField : byte[]
useEscaped() : void
useEscapedData : bool
captureConverter
Class
public
captureConverter()
splitSerialCaptureFile() : void
private
captureFile : FileStream
captureInput : StreamReader
captureOutput : BinaryWriter[]
openStreamArray : LinkedList<Stream>
outputFiles : FileStream[]
tuple
Class
public
deleteLastByte() : void
foundNewByte() : void
getBytes() : byte[]
getDistance() : double
getFitness() : double
getFitnessValue() : double
getFrequency() : double
getIndices() : int[]
getLength() : int
getNextTuple() : tuple
increaseByteString() : void
increaseFrequency() : void
numOccurences() : int
runFitness() : void
setFrequency() : void
ToString() : string
tuple() (+ 1 overload)
private
distance : double
fitness : double
frequency : double
indices : LinkedList<int>
initialFrequency : long
lastIndex : int
length : double
setFitness() : void
totalBytes : long
values : LinkedList<byte>
valuesString : string
checksum
Class
public
applyChecksum() : LinkedList<byte>
checksum() (+ 1 overload)
compare() : bool
getBytesFromEnd() : int
getBytesFromStart() : int
getFieldIndex() : int
getType() : string
isValid() : bool
Length() : int
reduceLength() : void
runChecksumCheck() : bool
setFieldIndex() : void
setLength() : void
setType() : void
toString() : string
tryChecksum() : bool
private
bcc() : byte
bytesFromEnd : int
checkBCC() : bool
checksumIndex : int
length : int
startIndex : int
type : string
plcCompMismatch
Class
public
applyMismatchToData() : LinkedList<byte>
compare() : bool
getBlock() : int
getComputerStartIndex() : int
getPLCStartIndex() : int
getReplaceValue() : byte[]
Length() : int
plcCompMismatch() (+ 1 overload)
setBlock() : void
setCompStartIndex() : void
setReplaceValue() : void
setValues() : void
toString() : string
private
computerStartIndex : int
length : int
plcStartIndex : int
replaceValue : byte[]
whichBlock : int
Figure C.3: Serial Capture Analysis and Profile Creation Classes.
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C.4 PLC Emulator Classes
plcRepeater
Class
public
createTraffic() : void
exit() : void
plcRepeater()
setBaud() : void
setDataBits() : void
setParity() : void
setPort() : void
setStopBits() : void
private
baudRate : int
comPort : SerialPort
comPortName : string
computerData : LinkedList<byte>
computerReader : computerDataBlockReader
dataBits : int
dataReceivedHandler() : void
getBaud() : int
getDataBits() : int
getParity() : string
getPortName() : string
getStopBits() : float
lastRead : DateTime
numPLCBlocks : int
openStreamArray : LinkedList<Stream>
parityBit : Parity
plcDataWriter : plcWriter
profile : protocolProfile
stop : StopBits
timedOut : bool
whoComputer : int
whoPLC : int
writeBuffer : LinkedList<byte>
writeStream : FileStream
plcWriter
Class
public
getBlockNum() : int
getNextData() : LinkedList<byte>
getRunning() : bool
plcWriter()
quit() : void
private
applyModifications() : LinkedList<byte>
canSend() : bool
computer : computerDataBlockReader
currentBlock : packetBlock
currentBlockNum : int
myValue : int
plcBlocks : LinkedList<packetBlock>
running : bool
writeBuffer : LinkedList<byte>
computerDataBlockReader
Class
public
addReceivedData() : void
computerDataBlockReader()
getBlock() : int
getCurrentIndex() : int
getData() : LinkedList<byte>
getRunning() : bool
quit() : void
private
addByte() : void
currentBlockNum : int
currentIndex : int
escapeByte : byte
increaseBlock() : void
lastData : LinkedList<byte>
myVal : int
packetlengths : int[]
receivedBlocks : LinkedList<packetBlock>
running : bool
startField : byte[]
startQueue : Queue<byte>
Figure C.4: PLC Emulator Classes.
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C.5 Captured Firmware Verification Classes
captureCompare
Class
public
captureCompare()
exit() : void
runCompare() : void
private
baselineData : FileStream
baselineMismatches : LinkedList<int>
compareBlocks() : bool
escapeByte : byte
getMismatches() : LinkedList<int>
mismatchErrorThrown : bool
newData : FileStream
openStreamArray : LinkedList<Stream>
originalData : byte[]
Figure C.5: Captured Firmware Verification Classes.
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C.6 Firmware Parse and Check Classes
firmwareParser
Class
public
exit() : void
firmwareParser()
runParser() : void
private
capturePath : string
fwFilePath : string
getProtocol() : string
needParse : bool
p : protocolParser
protocol : string
protocolList : string[]
protocolParser
Interface
public
parseFirmware() : string
df1fullduplexParser
Class
public
df1fullduplexParser()
parseFirmware() : string
private
binCIPoutput : FileStream
binCIPwriter : BinaryWriter
CIPoutput : FileStream
CIPpacketHeaderFields : string[]
CIPpacketIndicator : byte
CIPpacketIndicatorLocation : int
CIPwriter : StreamWriter
fieldSizes : string[]
fwIndicator : byte
fwIndicatorLocation : int
fwOutput : FileStream
fwWriter : BinaryWriter
globalCIPPacketCount : int
globalPacketCount : int
goodFwFilePath : string
openStreamArray : LinkedList<Stream>
output : FileStream
parseData() : void
parsedFwFilePath : string
printCIPOutput() : void
printOutput() : void
reader : BinaryReader
startBytes : byte[]
stopBytes : byte[]
writer : StreamWriter
fieldedPacket
Static Class
public
printData() : string
printFirmwareData() : byte[]
private
getDataStartIndex() : int
bitCompare
Static Class
public
checkCaptureContainsFwBytes() : bool
compareFirmwareFiles() : bool
protocolParser
Figure C.6: Firmware Parse and Check Classes.
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Appendix D: Tool Performing Test Cases
The following screenshots demonstrate use of the tool’s firmware verification routine.
Figure D.1: Tool function selection screen.
Figure D.2: Version 15 capture verification test.
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Figure D.3: Version 16 capture verification test.
Figure D.4: Byte added to firmware verification test.
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Figure D.5: Byte removed from firmware verification test.
Figure D.6: Byte added to protocol data verification test.
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Figure D.7: Byte removed from protocol data verification test.
Figure D.8: Byte modified in firmware verification test.
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Figure D.9: Byte modified in protocol data verification test.
72
Appendix E: Test Case Modifications
The following screenshots display firmware modification test case data.
Figure E.1: Version 15 firmware screenshot.
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Figure E.2: Version 15 firmware screenshot.
Figure E.3: Version 15 capture screenshot.
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Figure E.4: Version 16 capture screenshot.
Figure E.5: Byte added to firmware data.
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Figure E.6: Byte removed from firmware data.
Figure E.7: Byte added to protocol data.
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Figure E.8: Byte removed from protocol data.
Figure E.9: Byte modified in firmware data.
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Figure E.10: Byte modified in protocol data.
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